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Abstract
There is a growing concern that governments lose substantial corporate tax
revenue due to transfer pricing and debt shifting strategies. Existing literature
studies debt shifting and transfer pricing separately. In practice, however, the
choice of debt-to-asset ratios in a¢ liates and the transfer price of internal debt are
interrelated management decisions that are also mutually a¤ected by government
regulation. This paper models these strategies as intertwined. We nd that the
tax sensitivity of the corporate tax base depends on whether debt shifting and
transfer pricing are cost complements or substitutes. A second result is that stricter
regulation of debt shifting and transfer pricing may have the e¤ect of fostering such
activities.
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1 Introduction
Worldwide, there is a growing concern that governments are losing substantial corporate
tax revenue because of tax planning by multinational companies aimed at shifting prof-
its in ways that erode the taxable base to locations where they are subject to a more
favourable tax treatment. The case of Starbucks in the UK is one example of why such
worries are not unfounded (Bergin, 2012). In their nal declaration in June 2012 in
Mexico, the G20 leaders, in response to such worries explicitly referred to the need to
prevent base erosion and prot shifting.From a corporate point of view, however, it is
often claimed that business leaders have a responsibility towards their shareholders to
legally reduce their companys tax bill.
The OECD (2013) report on Base erosion and prot shifting identies transfer
pricing and debt shifting (thin capitalization) as major reasons for the tax-revenue drain in
high-tax countries. Both strategies are regulated by the OECDs arms lengthstandard,
which states that transfer prices should reect market prices chosen by unrelated parties
engaged in similar trades under similar circumstances (Eden, 1998; OECD, 2010, art.
9). As pointed out in several studies, arms-lengthpricing may be di¢ cult to enforce
because of the lack of market parallels, multinationalsuse of tax havens, and lack of
disclosure of either earnings worldwide or pricing methods.1
In the literature, the choice of transfer prices in a¢ liates is analyzed separately from
the choice of rmstax e¢ cient nancing structure.2 In this paper we argue that these
two choices are interrelated. There are several reasons for why this is so. First, consider
an agreement for an intercompany loan. In this type of transaction the interets rate is a
transfer price that is decided jointly with the loan amount. In such cases the two decisions
are interrelated. On a more general level, public regulation that pertains to leverage, say,
may a¤ect the scope for transfer pricing (and vice versa). Thin capitalization rules,
for instance, may make it relatively cheaper for the management to manipulate the
interest rate on intercompany loans. There may also be economies of scale and scope
related to tax planning that intertwines these decisions. For example, skills in concealing
abusive transfer-pricing practices may have positive spillover e¤ects on the rms ability
to disguise its real debt-to-asset ratio. Our study, therefore, responds to calls for more
research on how regulation and tax law a¤ect managerial decisions (see, e.g., Shackelford
and Shevlin, 2001; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010).3
Some of our core results provide a theoretical foundation for empirical ndings related
1These issues are discussed in Taylor and Richardson (2013), Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), Hope et al.
(2013), and Lo and Wong (2011).
2The literature on debt shifting is surveyed by Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010), whilst Gresik (2001)
and Göx and Schiller (2007) provide surveys of the transfer-pricing literature. Shackelford and Shevlin
(2001) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) review (empiricial) tax research in the accounting literature.
3Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008), Büttner et al. (2012), and Overesch and Wamser (2013)
study how rms respond to thin capitalization rules.
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to debt shifting and transfer pricing. Pak and Zdanowicz (2001) nd that the volume
of prot shifting in U.S. multinationals was equal to 18% of total reported corporate
prots in 2000.4 Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) study OECD data and point out that
65% to 87% of the (potential) additional tax revenue, stemming from a unilateral tax
increase, is lost due to prot shifting by transfer pricing. Despite the widespread use
of tax havens to streamline tax e¢ cient nancing structures, debt shifting seems to be
less tax sensitive.5 Studies on debt shifting and its response to changes in taxes show
that the semi-elasticity of internal debt lies between 0.69 and 1.3, which indicates small
behavioral changes following a tax change.6 A typical example is Büttner and Wamser
(2007, p. 25), who state:
...our ndings suggest that the implied magnitude of tax-revenue losses is rather mod-
est even for wholly-owned rms. To conclude, our ndings are indicative for substantial
costs of adjusting the capital structure for means of prot-shifting.
Our analysis ties in with the above literature and the conclusion by Büttner and
Wamser (2007), in that we show that when management takes into account all costs
related to tax minimization at the global level, including the restructuring of the business
(cf. Scholes et al., 2009, ch. 1.2), the e¤ects of tax-rate di¤erentials on debt shifting are
modest under reasonable assumptions. Our analysis, then, shows that transfer pricing
often is the more attractive prot shifting instrument .
A second set of results pertains to how the rental rate of capital is a¤ected by debt
shifting and transfer pricing. We nd that debt shifting reduces the rental rate of capital
and therefore increases investments. In contrast, manipulation of interest rates (the
transfer price) does not a¤ect the rental rate of capital or investments.
In a third step of our analysis, we investigate how management responds when the
corporate tax rate is changed. We show that a rise in the corporate tax rate makes it more
attractive to increase the debt-to-asset ratio and the volume of prots shifted, if we have
concealment cost complementarity. Complementarity here means that a higher debt-to-
asset ratio reduces marginal concealment costs of transfer pricing (and vice versa). Con-
cealment cost substitutability exists when marginal concealment costs related to prot
shifting rise when debt shifting increases (and vice versa). When we have cost substi-
tutability, we nd that management behaves in such a way that the corporate tax base
becomes less tax sensitive.
4Evidence for transfer pricing in the U.S. is given in Clausing (2003) and Bernard et al. (2006); for
Norway in Langli and Saudagran (2004); for Germany in Weichenrieder (2008). Oyelere and Emmanuel
(1998); Emmanuel and Oyelere (2002) show that foreign-owned a¢ liates in the UK are characterized by
lower prots but higher dividend distributions (than UK-controlled rms). Evidence for transfer pricing
in European multinationals is given in Dharmapala and Riedel (2013).
5Taylor and Richardson (2013) nd that multinationals that use tax havens as part of their strategy
to shift debt are more thinly capaitalized compared to rms that do not use tax havens.
6See, e.g., Mintz and Smart (2004), Desai et al. (2004), Büttner and Wamser (2007, 2013), Büttner
et al. (2009), and Møen et al. (2011).
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Our ndings with respect to government regulation are surprising. If a government
introduces thin-capitalization rules (or tightens existing rules), then, under concealment
cost substitutability, we show that management may respond by increasing the interest
premium, or by increasing leverage. This result is counterintuitive, because it suggests
that such rules could have unintended e¤ects (both on tax revenue and on the capital
structure). On the other hand, if we have concealment cost complementarity, the response
to stricter regulation is to lower both the debt-to-asset ratio and the volume of abusive
interest expenses.
Our analysis is undertaken in a setting where the central management of a multina-
tional rm decides on capital investments, leverage and the price of internal debt across
a¢ liates in di¤erent countries in order to save taxes globally. Thus, our analysis is sharply
focused on the tax saving role of transfer prices and debt. One could object that our ap-
proach misses out the role of transfer prices for internal management in multinationals.
However, only rarely do tax savings enter these contributions. Furthermore, there is
a strand of literature that presents evidence that transfer pricing and debt shifting in
multinationals are largely engineered to shift corporate income to low-tax jurisdictions.7
This literature suggests that the transfer prices that shift income are di¤erent from those
that provide managerial incentives. In addition, Göx and Schiller (2007; p 692) point out
that prots are usually higher in rms that avoid overburdening the transfer price with
dual roles.
If the multinational is restricted in its use of transfer prices so that a conict arises
between proft shifting and managerial incentives, the multinational could carry more
than one set of books. There is controversy in the literature over whether multinationals
employ two sets of books rather than one. Göx and Schiller (2007) in their survey of
the transfer pricing literature suggests that a non-neglible number of rms uses only one
set of books.8 Whether transfer prices are overburdened by conicting roles or not, and
whether rms use one or two sets of books is a discussion we shall leave out here. Our
focal point is to examine how rms set leverage and the transfer price on leverage, since
these two decisions are interrelated.
The sections of the paper are organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the basic
model and introduce the concealment cost functions. We derive the optimal use of debt
policy and of interest-rate manipulation, and analyze the implications of tax engineering
on real investment of the multinational rm in section 3, while in section 4, we examine
the tax sensitivity of debt shifting and of prot shifting. The e¤ectiveness and spill-over
e¤ects of regulation for the protection of tax bases are analyzed in section 5. In section
6, we o¤er some concluding remarks.
7See Jakob (1996), Weichenrieder (1996), Hines (1999), Gresik (2001), Bernard et al. (2006), Devereux
(2007) and Huizinga and Leuven (2008).
8The dual role of transfer prices and the use of two books are also discussed in Smith (1992) and
Nielsen and Raimondos-Møller (2012).
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2 The Model
We set up a model of a multinational rm (henceforth MNC) that has its headquarters
(henceforth HQ) located in any country p 2 f1; ng. The MNC can invest in a¢ liates in
n countries. These a¢ liates are assumed for simplicity to be price takers and they are
wholly owned. Each a¢ liate i employs Ki units of real capital that is used to produce
xi = F (Ki) units of a homogenous good whose output price is normalized to unity. The
production function F (Ki) exhibits positive and decreasing returns to capital (i.e., FK > 0
and FKK < 0). We shall further assume that world markets for real and nancial capital
are integrated and that capital is perfectly mobile. Each country is small and cannot
inuence interest rates and the market interest rate is exogenously given by r > 0.
To nance its investments in an a¢ liate in country i, the HQ can use equity Ei and
debt Di. Debt can be further broken down into external debt
 
DEi

and internal debt 
DIi

, where internal debt is obtained by borrowing from related a¢ liates. We dene Ki
as the total (real) capital employed by a¢ liate i and let bEi = D
E
i =Ki be the external
debt-to-asset ratio. In a similar fashion, bIi = D
I
i =Ki is the internal debt-to-asset ratio,
and we dene the overall leverage ratio (bi) of the MNC by bi = bEi +b
I
i =
 
DEi +D
I
i

=Ki:
Within the MNC, it must be the case that the sum of market interest payments on internal
borrowing and lending is zero across all a¢ liates, that is,X
i
r DIi =
X
i
bIi  r Ki = 0: (1)
The MNC can shift income to a¢ liates in other countries by under- or overinvoicing
intra-rm transactions. We model this by allowing the rm to deviate from the market
interest rate by levying a surcharge ~ri on the market interest rate in a¢ liate i:9 The total
interest costs of internal debt are then r+ ~ri, and the amount of prot shifted away from
a¢ liate i is given by
Pi = ~ri  bIi Ki: (2)
The sum of shifted prots across all a¢ liates can now be written asX
i
~ri  bIi Ki = 0: (3)
Theories of optimal capital structure assume that there are convex costs per unit of
capital associated with the use of external and internal debt.
External debt is seen as useful in order to discipline local managers from lax man-
9Alternative ways of conducting transfer pricing would be to overinvoice the use of an intermediate or
xed factor. These methods are traditionally analyzed in the prot-shifting literature. It can be shown
that our ndings hold in such settings as well. However, implementing additional inputs would further
increase notation and complexity.
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agement and empire-building strategies. However, as the leverage ratio goes up, the
risk of bankruptcy increases and may cause bankruptcy costs, or induce a debt-overhang
situation, in which protable investment is not undertaken. Too much external debt may
also be associated with a higher risk premium due to informational asymmetries. As is
usual in the literature, we dene costs of external debt by a U-shaped function CE(bEi );
where the optimal external leverage in absence of taxation (i.e., the cost-minimizing level
of external debt) is denoted by b.10
Internal debt also carries costs. In the literature, these are related to various tax-
engineering expenses incurred in order to avoid or relax regulations such as thin-capitali-
zation rules and/or controlled-foreign-company (CFC) rules (see, e.g., Fuest and Hem-
melgarn, 2005).11 We add to the cost structure of internal debt by allowing for the
possibility that low prots caused by either prot shifting (Pi) or/and high leverage may
arouse suspicion by the tax authorities and lead to a costly audit. Hence, low prots due
to transfer pricing, say, makes it more costly to use internal debt. In line with this, we
dene the cost function for internal debt as CI(bIi ; Pi):
The costs and benets of internal and external debt di¤er as is clear from the deni-
tions of the cost functions above. Internal debt could be seen as tax-favored equity, since
it does neither a¤ect the risk of bankruptcy nor reduce any informational asymmetry.12 It
is therefore not unreasonable to assume that the total cost function for debt is additively
separable in external and internal leverage, that is, CD(bEi ; b
I
i ; Pi) = CE(b
E
i ) + CI(b
I
i ; Pi),
if external credit markets are perfect (with the exception for costs related to nancial
distress and bankruptcy).
In line with the standard trade-o¤ literature, we assume that agency costs of debt
are convex in leverage, but proportional in real capital employed. For internal debt,
designing strategies to avoid anti-avoidance regulation (particularly, working around thin-
capitalization rules), and asking for expertsadvice imply higher costs.
In terms of imposing structure on the cost function, we assume that there are no
debt-related concealment costs when bIi  0; CI(0; Pi) = 0, even if the rm engages in
10See, e.g., Jensen (1986) on free cash-ows, Meckling and Jensen (1976) on moral hazard, Kraus and
Litzenberger (1973) on bankruptcy costs, and Myers (1977) on debt-overhang problems. Hovakimian et
al. (2004) and Aggrawal and Kyaw (2010) provide recent overviews on the full set of costs and benets
of external debt. To focus on the interplay of internal debt and prot shifting and to keep the model
simple, we neglect overall bankruptcy costs on the parent level. The latter would set an incentive to shift
external debt internationally; see Huizinga et al. (2008).
11See for example Mintz and Smart (2004), Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005), and Schindler and
Schjelderup (2012). Thin-capitalization rules are in place in many countries such as Germany, the
U.K, and the U.S., and also apply to foreign subsidiaries. See, e.g., Gouthière (2005) for a description of
several EU and non-EU countriesrules. Controlled-foreign-company rules are in place, e.g., in the US
and Germany and they deny tax-exemption of passive income in the home country of the MNC, provided
that tax avoidance is suspected (see Ruf and Weichenrieder, 2012).
12Indeed, Gertner et al. (1994) point out that internal debt does not show the properties of external
debt and that it should rather be seen as equity. Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) and Chowdhry and Coval
(1998, pp. 87) qualify internal debt as tax-preferred equity, supporting this view.
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abusive transfer pricing. In all other cases, costs of internal debt are a¤ected positively
by the total amount of prot shifting so that @CI=@Pi > 0.13
Formally, the properties applied to the cost function of debt can be summarized as:
Assumption 1 External credit markets are assumed to be perfect except for the debt
tax shield and nancial distress costs. The debt cost function is additively separable,
CD(b
E
i ; b
I
i ; Pi) = CE(b
E
i ) + CI(b
I
i ; Pi), and exhibits the properties
CE(b
E
i ) > 0 with C
0
E(b
E
i ) > 0; C
00
E(b
E
i ) > 0 if b
E
i >
bEi ;
C
0
E(b
E
i )  0; C
00
E(b
E
i ) > 0 if b
E
i  bEi ;
CI(b
I
i ; Pi) > 0 with
@CI(b
I
i ; Pi)
@bIi
> 0;
@2CI(b
I
i ; Pi)
@(bIi )
2
> 0 if bIi > 0;
@CI(b
I
i ; Pi)
@Pi
> 0;
@2CI(b
I
i ; Pi)
@P 2i
> 0 if bIi > 0;
CI(b
I
i ; Pi) = 0 with
@CI(b
I
i ; Pi)
@bIi
=
@CI(b
I
i ; Pi)
@Pi
= 0 8Pi if bIi  0:
Not only do MNCs face costs related to the use of debt, but shifting prot by transfer
prices also entails costs. Inspired by the literature on tax evasion (cf. Allingham and
Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974), these costs can be interpreted either as costs due to the
use of lawyers and accountants, and/or as expected penalties imposed if illegal interest-
rate manipulation is detected and ned by the tax authorities. In the latter case, the cost
function would imply that the detection probability as well as the nes increase in the
amount of shifted prots.14 Furthermore, we shall assume that the concealment costs of
prot shifting depend on the level of internal debt. Accordingly, we dene the concealment
cost function related to transfer pricing by CP (Pi; bIi ); which is a convex function in the
level of income shifted (Pi). The convexity in leverage bIi is due to that it is more costly to
hide (illegal) prot shifting if the debt-to-asset ratio is very high and taxable prots low
due to excessive interest deductions.15 It follows from this that @CP
@bIi
> 0.16 If Pi  0, we
assume that no costs occur because enlarging the tax base and increasing tax payments
13The e¤ect on the marginal costs of internal leverage from an increase in income shifted (that is,
@2CI=[@b
I
i @Pi]) is ambiguous, and for the time being, we do not impose any restrictions on it.
14Chan and Chow (1997), for example, nd that Chinese tax authorities are more prone to audit MNCs
if they show persistent losses or low protability relative to the industry average. These authors also
point out that the comparable-prot method is the most prominent pricing method in China (cf. table
7) and argue that their ndings are in line with earlier results for the US. For a detailed analysis of the
comparable-prot method under arms-length regulation see OECD (2010) and Gresik and Osmundsen
(2008).
15A¢ liates of MNCs with lower prots due to a debt-to-asset ratio signicantly higher than their peer
group are also more likely to be audited.
16As under debt, the cross derivative @
2CP
@Pi@bIi
? 0 is ambiguous, either because interest-rate manipulation
and internal debt can reinforce concealment costs, or because of positive spill-over e¤ects by enhanced
knowledge in hiding tax engineering.
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in such an a¢ liate should not induce local tax authorities to investigate and audit the
a¢ liate more closely. Formally, our assumptions are summarized below by
Assumption 2 The cost function of prot shifting exhibits
CP (Pi; b
I
i ) > 0 with
@CP (Pi; b
I
i )
@Pi
> 0;
@2CP (Pi; b
I
i )
@P 2i
> 0 if Pi > 0;
@CP (Pi; b
I
i )
@bIi
> 0;
@2CP (Pi; b
I
i )
@(bIi )
2
> 0 if Pi > 0;
CP (Pi; b
I
i ) = 0 with
@CP (Pi; b
I
i )
@Pi
=
@CP (Pi; b
I
i )
@bIi
= 0 if Pi  0:
To summarize, the timeline of the model is as follows. First, the government sets its
tax and regulatory instruments and the ultimate owners of the MNC equip the HQ in
country p with the necessary equity. Then, the HQ decides for all a¢ liates i, the amount
of equity, leverage (external and internal), and the price on internal debt in a¢ liate i.
After that, the nancial capital assigned to each a¢ liate is used to hire real capital for
producing the nal output good. The latter is sold at a given world-market price at unity.
In the next section, we rst solve for the tax-e¢ cient capital structure and the optimal
transfer price on internal debt. In a second step, we analyze optimal investment of
real capital.17 Finally, we investigate how HQs decisions are a¤ected by changes in
governments tax and regulation policies.
3 Prot Shifting and Debt Shifting
The HQ maximizes global prots after corporate taxation. Net global prots of the MNC
are given by
 =
X
i

ei   ti  ti

; (4)
where ei is economic prot in subsidiary i, 
t
i is taxable prot, and ti is the corporate
tax rate in country i: Economic prot is given by revenue minus user costs of capital and
prot shifting,
ei = F (Ki)  [r + CE(bEi ) + CI(bIi ; Pi)] Ki   ~ribIiKi   CP (Pi; bIi ); (5)
The tax code in most countries do not allow costs of equity to be deducted against
tax whilst interest expenses are deductible. As a consequence, taxable prot di¤ers from
true economic prot. In dening taxable prot, we assume that costs per unit of capital
associated with both external and internal borrowing are tax deductible. Some of these
17Note that it does not matter in our setting which stage of the maximization problem is solved rst,
choosing the tax-avoidance devices or determining real capital investment.
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costs may be associated with informational asymmetries between investors and managers
of the rm, or illegitimate action from the point of view of the tax authority. One could
argue that these costs should not be tax deductible. It is straightforward to show by
examination of the equations to follow that even if they were not deductible, it would
not a¤ect our results.
Taxable prot income can, after some manipulations, be written as
ti = F (Ki)  [rbEi + (r + ~ri)bIi + CE(bEi ) + CI(bIi ; Pi)] Ki   CP (Pi; bIi ); (6)
where capital invested in country i is nanced either by debt Di = DIi +D
E
i or by equity
Ei, so that Ki = DIi +D
E
i + Ei.
The HQ maximizes the value of the MNC after corporate taxes. Personal taxes
do not matter, since MNCs often either are owned by many institutional investors, or
shareholders located in di¤erent countries.18 The optimization problem of the rm can be
seen as a two-tier process: First, it chooses its optimal debt-to-asset ratio and the optimal
interest rate on internal debt for any given value of real investment Ki. Second, the rm
decides on how much real capital to use and therefore how much of the nal good to
produce in each country. Taking real investment Ki as xed initially, the rms optimal
tax-planning behavior is found by maximizing equation (4). Inserting for equations (5)
and (6), collecting terms, and taking into account the constraints on internal lending
and on prot shifting, that is, equations (1) and (3), the maximization problem can be
written as
max
bEi ;b
I
i ;~ri
 =
X
i

(1  ti)

F (Ki)  CP (Pi; bIi )

(7)
  Ki

r   tir(bEi + bIi ) + (1  ti)
 
CE(b
E
i ) + CI(b
I
i ; Pi)

+ (1  ti)~ribIi
	
s:t:
X
i
r  bIi Ki = 0 () s:t:
X
i
~ri  bIi Ki = 0 ();
where  and  are the associated Lagrangian parameters for internal debt and transfer
pricing, respectively.
18It can be shown that from the viewpoint of a shareholder in a MNC, maximizing prots of the MNC
after global corporate taxation and maximizing the net pay-o¤ on equity investment after opportunity
costs and personal (income) taxes, yield identical results under mild assumptions. For example, if
corporate taxes cannot be deducted against personal income tax and if the personal tax rate on dividends
and interest income is the same, it is straightforward to show that maximizing the value of the rm to
the owner and maximizing corporate prots coincide. These restrictions are fullled for a wide range
of real world tax codes: the classical corporate taxation system (e.g., in the U.S.), the German system
since 2009 (Abgeltungssteuer), where interest income, dividends and capital gains are taxed at 25%
and deductions for corporate taxes are not possible, and the Norwegian shareholder tax, introduced in
2006.
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Optimal manipulation of interest rates. Maximizing (7) with respect to ~ri, we
obtain
   (1  ti)  (1  ti)

@CP
@Pi
+
@CI
@Pi
Ki

8 i: (8)
The left hand side is the net marginal benet of prot shifting. It should be equal to
or less than the after-tax marginal concealment cost of interest-rate manipulation (right-
hand side). The Lagrangian parameter  gives the shadow value of an additional unit
of prot income shifted and can be shown to be equal to  = maxi(1   ti): We shall for
convenience let country 1 be the country with the lowest tax rate so that by denition
  (1   t1): The rst-order conditions in (8), then, imply that, for internal debt, each
a¢ liate i > 1 pays a (positive) surcharge on the market interest rate in order to shift
prots into a¢ liate 1 located in the lowest-tax country. Structuring transactions in this
way maximizes the gain from transfer pricing.
Tax e¢ cient nancing structure. The rst-order condition for external debt (bEi ) is
given by
C
0
E(b
E
i ) =
ti
1  ti  r > 0 8 i: (9)
Equation (9) states that the value of the debt tax shield should be exploited up until the
point where the associated costs of using external debt equals the marginal value of the
tax shield. The positive value of the debt tax shield implies that the optimal leverage
ratio of external debt in the presence of taxation (bEi ) is higher than the optimal leverage
ratio in absence of taxation
 
bEi

, that is, bEi > b
E
i .
Deriving and rearranging the rst-order condition for internal leverage bIi , we obtain
(ti   )r = (1  ti)

@CI
@bIi
+
@CP
@bIi
1
Ki

; (10)
where we have used that either equation (8) holds with equality, or that ~ri = 0.
The left hand side of equation (10) is the net marginal benet of debt shifting. It
should be equal to the tax-adjusted marginal cost of concealing debt and prot shifting.
The bracket on the left hand side of (10) consists of the marginal value of interest de-
ductions, ti; minus the the shadow cost of lending given by the Lagrangian multiplier :
It is straightforward to show that  = mini ti = t1; since we have dened country 1 as
the lowest-tax country. The implication of this is that, in order to maximize its value
after tax, a MNC will minimize tax payments by conducting lending activities from the
a¢ liate located in the country with the lowest rate of tax (i.e., a¢ liate 1 in our model).
Consequently, the value of the debt tax shield related to internal debt is given by ti  t1.
Optimal Real Investment. After determining the optimal degree of leverage and the
interest rate on internal debt, the HQ derives the e¤ective cost of capital (evaluated at
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a tax-e¢ cient nancial structure with optimal bEi and b
I
i and for the optimal transfer
price ~ri ). The e¤ective rental rate of capital can be shown to be equal to
reffi = r   tibEi r + (1  ti)CE(bEi )  (ti   t1) bIi r + (1  ti)CI(bIi ; P i )
 (ti   t1)bIi ~r + (1  ti)CP (P i ; bIi )
1
Ki
: (11)
In what follows, we use (11) to derive the following conditions19
@reffi
@~ri
=   (ti   t1) bIi + (1  ti)bIi

@CI
@Pi
Ki +
@CP
@Pi

= 0; (12)
@reffi
@Ki
=   1
Ki

(1  ti)CP (P i ; bIi )
1
Ki
  (ti   t1) bIi ~ri

: (13)
Inserting for the optimal values of debt and the rental rate of capital into the maxi-
mization problem (7), we can express the MNCs maximization problem with respect to
its use of capital by
max
Ki
X
i

(1  ti)F (Ki)  reffi (Ki) Ki

;
where, after applying equations (12) and (13), the rst order condition for capital can be
written as
F iK =
r
1  ti  
ti
1  ti rb
E
i + CE(b
E
i ) 

ti   t1
1  ti

rbIi + CI(b
I
i ; P

i ): (14)
Equation (14) shows that since debt is tax deductible the use of external and internal
debt to save taxes lowers the user cost of capital and leads to higher investment. In
contrast, interest-rate manipulation has no direct e¤ect on the user cost of capital. We
summarize this as
Lemma 1 Thin capitalization reduces e¤ective capital costs and increases real invest-
ment. Manipulating the interest rate on internal debt a¤ects the investment decision only
indirectly via the interplay with internal debt in the concealment cost functions.
It follows from Lemma 1 that excessive interest premiums do not a¤ect the real activity
of rms as long as the use of internal debt does not a¤ect concealment costs related
to transfer pricing (and vice versa). However, as seen from equations (11) and (10),
manipulating interest rates a¤ects the user cost of capital as well as the tax sensitivity
of internal debt if concealment costs of debt shifting and prot shifting also depend on
the level of abusive internal interest expenses and internal debt, respectively. The topic
of the next section is to explore what the consequences are of such a relationship.
19In deriving these results, we have used equation (8) twice.
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4 The Tax Sensitivity of Debt and of Prot Shifting
In this section, we examine how transfer pricing and leverage decisions are a¤ected by a
change in the corporate tax rate. In order to assess how a change in the corporate tax
rate a¤ects the use of internal debt, we totally di¤erentiate the rst-order condition (9).
This yields
dbEi
dti
=
r
(1  ti)2  C 00E(bEi )
> 0: (15)
Equation (15) shows that an increase in the tax rate of country i will induce the MNC
to use more external debt, since the value of the debt tax shield has risen. Note that
the higher tax sensitivity of external debt is independent of how much prot is shifted
through interest manipulation or the use of internal debt.
To facilitate a discussion on how the transfer price (~ri) and the internal debt-to-asset
ratio (bIi ) are a¤ected by a tax increase, we must make assumptions on how the marginal
cost of internal leverage is a¤ected by prot shifting, that is, on the sign of @2CI=(@bIi @Pi).
We assume that the e¤ects of one activity on concealment costs of the other activity are
qualitatively symmetric, that is, signf@2CI=(@bIi @Pi)g = signf@2CP=(@bIi @Pi)g. The sign
of this cross-derivative is ambiguous and depends on how debt shifting and transfer pricing
a¤ect total concealment costs.
We dene concealment cost substitutability the following way:
Denition 1 Concealment cost substitutability exists when the marginal concealment
costs related to prot shifting (Pi) rise when debt shifting (bIi ) increases (and vice versa),
that is; @
2CI
@bIi @Pi
; @
2CP
@bIi @Pi
> 0:
To see why marginal concealment costs may rise due to an increase in either transfer
pricing or debt shifting, one can perceive that tax authorities compare prots of MNCs
a¢ liates to prots of their peer group in order to decide on an audit. If an a¢ liate is
having a high internal debt-to-asset ratio, then, if the rm also uses the transfer price
to shift prot this reduces prot further and increases the likelihood of a costly audit.
Another example relates to thin-capitalization rules. Such rules are meant to prevent a
too high debt-to-asset ratio. If the rm shifts too much prot by manipulating the interest
rate, prots will be low and this has a negative e¤ect on book equity. Consequently, prot
shifting may lead to that thin-capitalization rules come into force and might even induce
tax authorities to audit the rm. In order to avoid an audit, the rm must make more
use of accountants and lawyers to reduce the probability of an audit.
In line with the denition above, we dene concealment cost complementarity as:
Denition 2 Concealment cost complementarity exists, when the marginal concealment
costs related to prot shifting fall when debt shifting increases (and vice versa), that is;
@2CI
@bIi @Pi
; @
2CP
@bIi @Pi
< 0:
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Denition 2 indicates that the cross derivatives may be negative as well. This could
happen if there are pure economies of scale. For example, a MNC has acquired special
skills in concealing prot-shifting activities due to the sheer volume of such transactions
and can use these skills for debt shifting as well (and vice versa).
In order to examine the management response with respect to excessive interest de-
ductions and to internal leverage following a change in the corporate tax rate ti; we
di¤erentiate the rst-order conditions (8) and (10) with respect to ti.20 The change in
internal debt is given by
dbIi
dti
=
(1  t1)

A  rbIiKi  B  bIi

(1  ti)2SOC
8>><>>:
> 0 if @
2CI
@bIi @Pi
< 0;
? 0 if @2CI
@bIi @Pi
> 0;
(16)
where A = @2CP=@P 2i +(@
2CI=@P
2
i )Ki > 0 is the direct e¤ect related to increased prot
shifting (Pi). It measures the change in marginal concealment costs of prot shifting fol-
lowing a change in the amount of prot shifted (i.e., the curvature of the concealment cost
function related to prot shifting). The term B =
 
@2CI=[@b
I
i @Pi]

Ki + @
2CP=(@b
I
i @Pi)
is the indirect cost interaction e¤ect. It shows how transfer pricing a¤ects the cost of
shifting debt (and vice versa), i.e., whether the concealment cost function inhibits cost
substitutability or complementarity. The second order condition is given by the term
SOC > 0.
If we have concealment cost complementarity (@2CI=@bIi @Pi < 0), the squared bracket
in the numerator in equation (16) is unambiguously positive. In this case internal debt
will rise following a tax increase since the direct e¤ect as well the cost interaction e¤ect
go in the same direction.
Under concealment cost substitutability the numerator cannot be signed, since the
direct e¤ect goes against the cost interaction (indirect) e¤ect. Internal debt may fall or
rise following a tax increase depending on the relative magnitudes of the two terms in
the squared bracket.
The change in rm behavior when it comes to the amount of prot shifted is given
by dPi=dti = (d~ri=dti) bIiKi +
 
dbIi =dti

~riKi, which can be written out in full as
dPi
dti
=
(1  t1)

D  bIi  B  rbIiKi

(1  ti)2SOC
8>><>>:
> 0 if @
2CI
@bIi @Pi
< 0;
? 0 if @2CI
@bIi @Pi
> 0;
(17)
where D = (@2CI=@(bIi )
2)Ki+@
2CP=@(b
I
i )
2 > 0 is the direct e¤ect on the cost function of
increasing internal debt (i.e., the curvature of debt-shifting-related concealment costs).
We may now state the following results:
20For a full derivation see the Appendix
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Proposition 1 The tax sensitivity of internal debt and prot shifting (Pi) is a¤ected by
the concealment cost function in the following way:
(a) Concealment cost complementarity ( @
2CI
@bIi @Pi
< 0) increases the tax sensitivity of both
debt and prot shifting; that is dbIi =dti > 0 and dPi=dti > 0.
(b) Concealment cost substitutability ( @
2CI
@bIi @Pi
> 0) reduces the tax sensitivity of both
debt and prot shifting and dbIi =dti ? 0 and dPi=dti ? 0.
All else equal, a rise in the corporate tax rate ti makes it more attractive to increase
the debt-to-asset ratio and the interest rate. The exact response from management,
however, depends on the properties of the concealment cost functions and in particular
the interaction between the direct cost e¤ect and indirect cost interaction e¤ect.
Proposition 1 states that under concealment cost complementarity the direct and
indirect cost e¤ect go in the same direction so that a rise in the corporate tax rate
induces the MNC to shift more debt and increase the transfer price. As a result, more
prots are shifted and the corporate tax base is more tax sensitive. The reason is that
under concealment cost complementarity the indirect cost e¤ect mitigates the increase in
marginal concealment costs of debt shifting and transfer pricing.
Under concealment cost substitutability, one prot shifting activity, say, manipulating
the interest rate, makes it more costly to shift debt. Hence, the direct e¤ect which
indicates that it has become more protable to shift prot is o¤set by the indirect cost
interaction e¤ect. The end outcome, then, depends on the relative magnitudes of the
direct and the indirect e¤ect. As a consequence, a higher corporate tax rate may under
certain circumstances induce the MNC to shift less prot/or reduce the debt-to-asset
ratio.21 What is certain is that the tax sensitivity of the corporate tax base is lower than
if the two tax-engineering e¤orts did not interact.
Proposition 2 Irrespective of the properties of the concealment cost function, the tax
sensitivity of interest-rate manipulation (d~ri=dti) cannot be signed, even if a higher tax
rate increases the amount of prot shifted (dPi=dti > 0).
The e¤ect on the optimal interest-rate manipulation ~ri is ambiguous for any speci-
cation of concealment costs. In general, a higher tax rate leads to more prot shifting
(rise in Pi = ~ri  bIi  Ki) and induces the MNC to use more internal leverage bIi . Since
a higher leverage ratio bIi also shifts more prot, the interest rate ~ri may have to fall to
ensure that the optimal amount of prot is shifted.
21In any case, the tax base (TB) of the MNC will shrink, however, because it can be shown that
@TB
@ti
=   1 t1(1 ti)2
bIi
SOC

(rKi)
2A  2rKiB +D

< 0 even for xed capital investment. The result follows
from applying the fact that AD  B2 > 0 from the SOC > 0 to hold.
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Our results above should be contrasted to the ndings in the empirical literature
where a main insight is that the management of a MNC is more likely to respond to a
tax change by manipulating transfer prices than debt. In particular, evidence suggests
that internal debt is not very sensitive to changes in the corprate tax rate (see e.g.,
Büttner and Wamser, 2007; Møen et al., 2011). Based on our results in equations (16)
and (17), the ndings in the empirical literature could be explained by the availability of
multiple prot shifting instruments, where debt is an instrument that is more expensive
to manipulate. In other words, transfer pricing and debt shifting are cost substitutes and
the prole of the concealment cost curve di¤ers for the two, with a high concealment cost
curvature for debt shifting and a low for transfer pricing.22
Cost substitutability will decrease the tax-rate sensitivities of both instruments, all
else equal. If under cost substitutability, we have a large increase in marginal concealment
costs related to internal debt whereas costs related to transfer pricing are low, we obtain
magnitudes of tax sensitivities in line with the empirical literature. Such di¤erences
in costs may be explained, for example, by binding thin-capitalization rules, whereas
regulation of transfer prices provides the MNC with a larger degree of discretion.
5 Government Regulation
In this section, we study how political measures to protect the tax base a¤ect management
decisions. In particular, we examine how thin-capitalization rules, and rules that place
restrictions on the amount of prot shifted a¤ect management decisions.
In order to facilitate the analysis, we rewrite the concealment cost function of internal
debt as CI = CI(bIi ; Pi; i), where i is a parameter that measures the tightness of thin-
capitalization rules in country i. A higher i (i.e., tighter thin-capitalization rules) is
taken to imply that it becomes more costly to circumvent such rules. We shall also invoke
the reasonable assumption that tighter thin-capitalization rules make it more costly to
shift debt and prot, that is, @2CI=(@bIi @i) > 0 and @
2CI=(@Pi@i) > 0, but we shall
not allow these e¤ects to go to innity. The latter implies that MNCs may still nd ways
to circumvent thin-capitalization rules as this seems to be in line with empirical research
on thin capitalization rules (see, e.g., Weichenrieder and Windischbauer, 2008; Büttner
et al., 2012).
We denote the concealment costs of prot shifting as CP = CP (bIi ; Pi; i), where i
is a parameter that indicates the strictness of arms-length pricing regulation in country
i. An increase in i implies higher concealment costs or higher nes if prot shifting is
detected. Similar to the case of thin-capitalization rules, stricter transfer-pricing regu-
22In technical terms, the tax-rate sensitivity for each instrument - confer equations (16) and (17) is
determined by the gradients of the marginal concealment costs (all else equal) not the absolute level of
the marginal concealment costs.
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lation increases marginal concealment costs of manipulating interest expenses, that is,
@2CP=(@b
I
i @i) > 0; @
2CP=(@Pi@i) > 0.
Di¤erentiating the rst-order conditions (8) and (10) and doing comparative statics
on tighter thin-capitalization rules (i), we nd that23
dbIi
di
=
bIiKi
SOC

@2CI
@Pi@i
B   @
2CI
@bIi @i
 A
8>><>>:
< 0 if @
2CI
@bIi @Pi
< 0;
? 0 if @2CI
@bIi @Pi
> 0;
(18)
dPi
di
=
bIiKi
SOC

@2CI
@bIi @i
B   @
2CI
@Pi@i
D
8>><>>:
< 0 if @
2CI
@bIi @Pi
< 0;
? 0 if @2CI
@bIi @Pi
> 0:
(19)
Comparative statics on the prot-shifting regulation parameter (i) yields
dbIi
di
=
bIi
SOC

@2CP
@Pi@i
B   @
2CP
@bIi @i
 A
8>><>>:
< 0 if @
2CI
@bIi @Pi
< 0;
? 0 if @2CI
@bIi @Pi
> 0;
(20)
dPi
di
=
bIi
SOC

@2CP
@bIi @i
B   @
2CP
@Pi@i
D
8>><>>:
< 0 if @
2CI
@bIi @Pi
< 0;
? 0 if @2CI
@bIi @Pi
> 0:
(21)
Based on equations (18) and (19), we may state:
Proposition 3 Tighter thin-capitalization regulation decrease both debt shifting and prot
shifting under concealment cost complementarity. With concealment cost substitutability,
tighter thin-capitalization regulation may foster more debt shifting (thin capitalization) or
transfer pricing.
The mechanisms that lead to these results are similar to those explained in the previ-
ous section. For concealment cost complementarity, there is a win-win situation from the
point of view of the government. Stricter thin-capitalization rules will increase marginal
concealment costs and reduce debt shifting and prot shifting. Reduced debt shifting
increases marginal costs of prot shifting further and the indirect cost interaction e¤ects
induce an even stronger reduction in both kinds of tax engineering. In contrast, when
one activity increases concealment costs related to other tax-engineering e¤orts (i.e., for
concealment cost substitutability), the outcome is in general ambiguous and depends on
the specic form of the concealment cost functions. In this case, paradoxical outcomes
may result. One example is that rules intended to reduce thin capitalization could relax
23A full derivation for both i and i is given in the Appendix.
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the costs of transfer pricing ( @
2CI
@bIi @Pi
; @
2CP
@bIi @Pi
> 0) and thus increase prot shifting. Such an
outcome would be particularly inauspicious, because prot shifting appears to be more
tax aggressive and does not result in any higher investment (contrary to debt shifting;
cf. Lemma 1).
When it comes to regulation that a¤ects the rms ability to shift prot, we summarize
the insights from equations (20) and (21) as follows:
Proposition 4 Under concealment cost complementarity, stricter regulation to prevent
prot shifting decreases both debt shifting and prot shifting. Under concealment cost
substitutability, regulation may lead to more debt shifting or more prot shifting.
The unintended e¤ects of regulation under concealment cost substitutability is clearly
seen from equation (19), where tougher regulation of prot shifting may actually foster
more prot shifting and reduce the costs of working around thin-capitalization rules so
that the debt-to-asset ratio rises. We stress, however, that regulation in this case may
also result in less leverage and prots shifted, and that in general, the outcome depends
on the relative magnitudes of the interplay between concealment costs related to the use
of internal leverage and prot shifting.
Propositions (3) and (4) show that it is of crucial importance to have knowledge
about functional forms of the concealment function when enacting policy to protect the
corporate tax base. If concealment cost functions exhibit substitutability, government
action may lead to management responses that go in the opposite direction of what the
policy aims at achieving.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have departed from the traditional view in the literature where the choice
of transfer prices on internal leverage in a¢ liates is decided separately from the choice
of rmstax e¢ cient nancing structure. Rather we have argued that these decisions
are interrelated. The analysis has answered two key questions. The rst pertains to how
concealment costs related to debt shifting and prot shifting a¤ect management responses
to changes in corporate taxes. The second concerns how government regulation intended
to curb prot shifting a¤ects tax planning and prot shifting by multinationals. We show
that policies intended to protect national tax bases may have unintended e¤ects under
concealment cost substitutability. Our ndings point to that it is of crucial importance to
have more knowledge about costs related to activities that often are labelled tax avoidance
or tax evasion in order to understand how management in multinationals behaves. These
costs may di¤er depending on the type of activity the rm engages in, and they may
a¤ect other tax-engineering e¤orts as well. It can be shown that our study carries over
to a more general setting where the transfer price is not related to debt.
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